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ABSTRACT: Two contrasting theories, or variants of them, are
predominant in the current debate on visual cognition. The standard inferential theory sees perception as a process involving the
role of memory, past experiences and semantic abilities, whereas
the direct theory sees perception as a connection between the perceiver and the environment that does not recruit internal information processing. In particular, the direct theory has recently been
invoked because it would be able to explain the sensorimotor coupling of perception and action in humans and animals without
relying on controversial notions such as those of conceptualization and propositional information. This paper aims to show that
even an inferential theory of perception has enough resources to
account for sensorimotor processes without necessarily involving
high level cognitive functions. My claim is that there are genuine
instances of sensorimotor inferential processing that do not rely
on conceptual structures and propositional knowledge. Several
theoretical and empirical arguments are provided to support this
statement.
1. INTRODUCTION

Our everyday life rests on the assumption that perception keeps us in
contact with the world. But what does it mean to be in perceptual contact with something? Two contrasting accounts of visual perception
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are currently predominant in the cognitive sciences. One is the theory
of inferential perception (hereafter IP) originally introduced in the early
works of Hermann von Helmholtz (1867), and developed by authors
such as Fodor (1975), Marr (1982), and Pylyshyn (1986). The other
is the theory of direct perception (thereafter DP) initially related to the
ecological psychology of James J. Gibson (1979), and recently reformulated within different frameworks by authors such as Noë (2005),
Gallagher (2008), and Chemero (2009). These two accounts are usually considered mutually incompatible, supporting opposing views of
how visual perception relates to things and events in the world. Indeed, while the former has been traditionally conceived as supporting
a mediated relationship between the environment and the percept, the
latter aims to remove any mediation between the percept and the information conveyed by the stimulus.
According to IP, perceiving an object is an ordering process that combines the stimulus information with other internal resources. This view
is committed to the poverty of the stimulus thesis, first developed by
Chomsky to account for language acquisition, and then extended to
perceptual processes as well. According to this view, the senses are provided with impoverished, inaccurate information about external objects
and events, whereas perceptual processing is accurate and elaborate.
This leads one to view the perceptual stimulus as inherently poor and
in need of supplementation by intelligent processing. Since the perceptual stimulus is impoverished and inaccurate, it follows that an inner
source of knowledge is required to overcome this deficiency, making
it possible to infer generalizations and analogies. Traditionally, memories, conceptual structures, and propositional information have been
seen as the elements enabling a complex percept to be derived from
initially poor stimulation.
By contrast with inferentialism in perception, DP assumes that the
visual stimulus suffices, and that no additional information is needed.
According to this view, the system directly detects information about
environmental properties without involving previously acquired propositional knowledge and conceptual structures. In light of this, DP has recently been invoked as the better way to account for the coupling of perception and action in pre-linguistic humans and animals, since it does
not rely on high level cognitive abilities or ad hoc cognitive modules
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(e.g., Gallagher 2005; Noë 2005; Chemero 2009; Hutto & Myin 2013).
However, it has been argued quite convincingly that DP is unable to
account for the poverty of the stimulus in classification tasks, and for
perceptual errors and illusions (e.g., Ulman 1980; Fodor & Pylyshyn
1981).
The aim of this paper is to argue that is possible to account for the
coupling of perception and action in terms of inferential processing. To
support this claim I introduce a dual theory of perceptual processing,
and show that there is a kind of inferential process that does not involve
the retrieval of previously acquired conceptual structures and propositional information. Moreover, I intend to provide a model of sensorimotor processing that, unlike other inferentialist approaches (e.g., Marr
1982; Fodor 1975), does not require the postulation of specialized cognitive modules.
In particular, I argue in favor of a refined approach to IP according
to which the stimulus suffices for sensorimotor tasks without involving a rule for high level cognitive abilities. This is made possible by
distinguishing between a linear kind and a distributed kind of processing, so that the former can be adopted to frame object recognition and
conceptualization, while the latter serves in cases of pattern detection
in sensorimotor processing. In particular, I argue that the sensorimotor matching system of the dorsal stream in visual processing can be
regarded as an instance of linear processing serving perception of action possibilities in the environment without relying on propositional
information and conceptual skills. To support this claim, I present two
cases of visual agnosia – apperceptive vs associative – and argue that it
is possible to discriminate between instances of the linear kind and the
distributed kind of processing in the early stage of perception. Finally,
my claim is that IP may provide a good account for a special instance
of perception and action coupling, namely the case of affordance perception.
2. A REFINED APPROACH TO INFERENTIAL PERCEPTION

Inferentialism has been the mainstream view in cognitive science over
the past decades. It is worth noticing that IP has been traditionally conceived as a multistage process involving the role of memory, past expe-
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riences, and semantic abilities. According to this traditional interpretation, inferential perception has been conceived as a form of distributed
processing where the perceptual stimulus activates a larger pattern of
multimodal components that are integrated through dedicated connections and areas. More precisely, when the perceptual stimulus elicits
the activation of one of those components, the larger pattern is activated by the automatic triggering of a causal mechanism. Accordingly,
after the stimulus reaches the perceptual apparatus, a network of internal components of semantic representation and conceptual schemas
is activated. This is made possible by a multistage processing through
which salient aspects are extracted from the selected stimulus via associative processes, and finally combined with other internal resources
such as memory retrievals and propositional information. Notably, on
this view, when an initial stimulus activates a larger system of functional
representations, the propositional information conveyed by this system
of representations complements the information that the stimulus conveys, making possible generalizations and other inferential reasoning.
However, this is not the only inferential model of perception. Indeed, it is possible to conceive IP as involving a form of linear processing that does not require the possession of high level cognitive functions
as a precondition. Indeed, it could be that the perceptual stimulus activates modality-specific feature detectors in the early stage of information processing, and that during this processing specific neural networks are immediately activated by configural features, such as edges,
line orientation, and surface shape, whereas others correlate with the
perception of movements and actions (Zeki 1993; Palmer 1999; Barsalou 2005)). This makes it plausible to hypothesize that the external
stimuli suffice to activate feature detectors endowed with a functional
role to both represent the surrounding space and coordinate actionrelated behaviors. Remarkably, this linear processing does not require
a complementary role for other internal resources, such as memories
and propositional information.
It should be noted, moreover, that this dual theory of IP is not based
on a mere distinction of functional areas in the brain, instead it is concerned with the difference between two structures of processing that
are instantiated in perception. Actually, the distinction between the
linear kind and the distributed kind of processing is not a question of
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localizing cortical functions, but rather of discriminating between different sequences of operations involved in perceptual information processing. Notably, while linear processing can be seen as the ability to
select specific patterns from a complex stimulus, distributed processing
requires that the information conveyed by the stimulus be combined
with and complemented by other internal resources.
Interestingly, this dual-processing model reflects an important distinction between two cognitive abilities: feature perception and conceptual binding. The former is the ability to detect environmental features
by using a specific sensitivity, whereas the latter is the ability to organize
and recruit a distributed pattern of information into complex structures
(Gerrans 2012). While feature perception is a relatively rigid process
implemented by localized circuits, conceptual binding is more flexible
and depends on the coordinated activity of a widely distributed information system (Ashby et al. 1996; Coltheart 1999).
Importantly, the distinction between a distributed and a linear kind
of processing does not mirror the distinction between a representational
form and a non-representational form of perception. Indeed, depending on the notions of representation and information we adopt, it is
possible to conceive the linear kind of processing as conveying information about the motor related properties that characterize the environment, such as the shape, the size, and the orientation of a target object. Of course, this eventually requires admitting the possibility
of non-propositional formats of representation (Butterfill & Sinigaglia
2012, see also the next section for an example).
Though they are different in structure and in the kind of information
they convey, it is possible to assume that both linear and distributed
information processing are involved in IP, serving different cognitive
tasks (I will provide empirical evidence for this claim in the next two
sections). For instance, when looking at an object in front of you, say
a mug, you may have different aims. Your aim might be to grasp it to
drink, or it might be to identify the kind of object you have in front of
you. Accordingly, although the proximal stimulus is the same in both
cases, different tasks require different perceptual abilities.
In the first case, what you need is to detect those patterns of stimulation that are usually correlated with the mug’s possibilities of action
according to your motor abilities and intentions to act. Therefore, it is
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not necessary that you recognize the mug as a certain kind of mug, such
as a Chinese tea mug, or a cheaper plastic mug. The detection of specific edges and geometrical patterns might be sufficient to shape your
action in accordance with your intention. As stated before, the detection of perceptual patterns that correlate with environmental properties
may be described as a linear kind of processing, that is, as an activity of
selection that does not involve conceptual and propositional resources
that complement the stimulus.
On the other hand, in the second case, when you are looking at a
mug in order to identify the kind of object you have in front of you, the
retrieval of internal resources seems to be required. Indeed, the ability
to detect those patterns of stimulation associated with the shape, the
color, and other properties is not enough for the success of a recognition
task. Rather, the activation of a system involving semantic abilities,
memory, and propositional information about the mug is necessary in
this case. Accordingly, since the information conveyed by the stimulus
is not enough, this recognition task requires distributed processing and
the triggering of high level cognitive mechanisms.
3. DISTRIBUTED AND LINEAR PROCESSING: TWO CASES OF AGNOSIA

Though, in a famous paragraph, Gibson states that perceiving possibilities of action does not involve classification (Gibson 1979, p. 134), it
should be recognized that our lives depend on the ability to discern and
direct our behavior toward different classes of objects and events that
populate the environment. There are things and organisms that we do
or do not eat, mate with, or grasp, and things among which, for different purposes, we tend to discriminate according to their interactions
and uses.
Recently, Withagen & Chemero (2011) have argued that there are
perceptual variables that carry information about objects being members of classes without specifying that those objects are members of
those classes. Accordingly, by detecting those perceptual variables, one
can engage in behavior that requires distinguishing between objects
that are members of different classes, without the need of recognizing
those objects as members of specific classes. This means that classification skills could be underwritten by low level cognitive processes
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only, without involving propositional information, memory retrieval
and other forms of conceptual reasoning.
This issue gains even more importance in light of the influential
dual-stream theory of visual perception (Goodale & Milner 1992; Milner & Goodale 1995; Norman 2002; Jacob & Jeannerod 2003). According to this view, after entering the brain, the visual stimulus splits
into two different streams: the dorsal path, where the information is
used to accomplish low level cognitive tasks such as representing space
and guiding actions; and the ventral path, where the information is
employed for high level cognitive tasks such as object classification.
Interestingly, it has been argued that the dorsal path is based on a
discriminatory capacity that is not mediated by propositional information, whereas the ventral-path requires the involvement of information
stored in a semantic system, and is therefore considered to be always
engaged in associative processing and high level cognitive tasks (Norman 2002).
According to the influential dual-stream theory of visual perception,
it is in the ventral stream that the classification of the perceptual stimulus occurs (Milner & Goodale 1995; Norman 2002; Jacob & Jeannerod
2003). Since this operation requires integration of perceptual information with preexisting internal resources that complement the stimulus,
perceptual classification should be thought of as relying on distributed
processing (Marr 1982; Fodor & Pylyshyn 1981; Biederman 1995).
However, the view that our perceptual ability is based only on distributed processing is too simplistic, and needs to be amended in many
respects. I argue that referring to two forms of visual agnosia can help
to improve the distinction among different cases of perceptual information processing: one distributed kind that relies on propositional information, and another simpler kind that relies on a (non-propositional)
direct matching system.
Visual agnosia is a neurophysiological syndrome characterized by a
failure of object identification, resulting in difficulties in verbally naming, and behaviorally classifying things in the visual field. Interestingly,
cases of visual agnosia do not impair action abilities, so that subjects
suffering from this syndrome are able to reach for and grasp objects,
but are unable to name and classify them.
This syndrome is generally associated with selective damage in the
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ventral stream of the visual system (Riddoch & Humphreys 2003). Notably, an increasing amount of evidence has shown that there are two
different ways in which object perception may be impaired following
lesions at different levels of perceptual processing.1 The first is called
“associative agnosia”, and involves damage to the connection between
the perceptual stimulus and stored propositional information about the
target (McCarthy & Warrington 1986). The second is called “apperceptive agnosia”, and is caused by damage at the very early stage of
processing perceptual features (Shelton et al. 1994).
Cases of associative agnosia have been variously explained by postulating a disconnect between visual information processing and the
storing of semantic representations (Carlesimo et al. 1998; Geschwind
1965), but also by postulating the loss of propositional memory of the
object (Mesulam 1985). More recently, Riddoch and Humphrey have
proposed the possibility of two independent forms of internal resources
serving object recognition: stored semantic knowledge and stored structural descriptions (Riddoch & Humphreys 2003). While semantic knowledge specifies our concept of an object, structural knowledge encodes
the properties that characterize the perceptual description of the object.
For example, patient JB (Riddoch & Humphreys 1987) was able
to visually describe objects, but relatively poor at making judgments
about which objects from a group of three could be associated, despite
being able to make the same judgments when dealing with the spoken names of the objects. This shows that JB has intact access to the
structural information concerning objects, but a deficit in visually accessing stored semantic representations of them (Riddoch & Humphreys
2003).2 In a different case, patient DM was able to provide semantic
information concerning animate and inanimate items, but showed an
impairment when asked to provide perceptual descriptions of presented
objects. This suggests that DM has a disorder in stored structural knowledge of things, but intact access to semantic information (Riddoch &
Humphreys 2003).
Interestingly, patients suffering from associative agnosia have their
classification abilities impaired because of damage to the connection
between the visual stimulus and their semantic representations of the
object. This means that normal subjects have perceptual classification
ability that relies on a distributed system involving the subject’s beliefs,
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past experience, and propositional memory, whereas this skill is impaired in patients suffering from associative agnosia. Accordingly, cases
of associative agnosia make it possible to isolate a perceptual classification ability that relies on a kind of distributed processing in the ventral
stream serving inferential perception.
Something different occurs in cases of apperceptive agnosia. Patients suffering from this syndrome show a profound deficit in the normal coding of simple perceptual patterns, such as orientations, and
shapes (Campion & Latto 1985; Vecera & Gilds 1998). An example
of apperceptive agnosia is the much-studied case of patient DF (Milner
et al. 1991) who suffered from a large bilateral occipital lesion disconnecting the inferior temporal lobes from visual inputs. DF’s memory
was good and she showed no impairment in her semantic ability. However, DF was unable to indicate the size of an object by imitating the
distance with her fingers and showed a critical impairment in discriminating between lines with different angular orientations. Despite this,
DF was able to reach and grasp a real object, shaping her hand according to the size of the object to be grasped. This condition has been
explained as a consequence of the fact that the brain damage suffered
by DF interrupted the normal flow of visual information, affecting the
early coding of individual features such as shapes and contours. Since
DF’s primary visual cortex was largely intact, the information flow from
this structure to the ventral stream had likely been compromised. However, the input to the dorsal stream remained essentially intact Milner
et al. (1991); Milner & Goodale (1995); James et al. (2003).3
A different case of apperceptive agnosia is that of the patient HJA,
who had a deficit in the identification of line drawings and figure shapes,
and in their comparison as well Riddoch & Humphreys (1987, 2003)).
HJA was able to process simple visual information, showing the ability
to copy figures and normal performance in semantic and memory tasks.
In particular, unlike DF, HJA was able to detect simple visual features in
the environment, but she was not able to combine them into a coherent
percept. This deficit has been explained as a problem in integrating individual visual information, resulting in a form of apperceptive agnosia
(Riddoch & Humphreys 1987; Vecera & Gilds 1998).
Both cases of apperceptive agnosia exemplified by the patients DF
and HJA make it possible to isolate a specific kind of perceptual ability
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that is not served by the retrieval of semantic memory and propositional information. It is possible to hypothesize that, in normal organisms, simple perceptual classification tasks can be performed merely by
relying on the early detection of specific visual patterns, without involving any role for previously stored propositional information. This
means that an organism may be able to trace a member of a certain
class of objects by detecting those visual patterns that recurrently denote its class, and do so by using only the information contained in the
stimulus.
To sum up, the distinction between associative and apperceptive
agnosia suggests the possibility of isolating two different levels of perceptual classification abilities. Associative agnosia is an impairment of a
high level classification ability based on distributed processing combining visual information with memory and propositional representations.
Patients suffering from this syndrome lose their ability to recognize an
object as a member of a certain class. Instead, apperceptive agnosia
is an impairment of a lower level ability that serves the classification
of objects according to the detection of salient patterns in a complex
stimulus, such as those relating to the object shape and orientation.
Patients suffering from this syndrome lose their capacity to detect and
manipulate elementary aspects of the environment through distributed
processing, resulting in the inability to trace and classify the surrounding things.
4. THE SENSORIMOTOR MATCHING SYSTEM

An example from the recent neuroscience of visual perception may
show that there is a way to account for the sensorimotor coupling of
perception and action even at the level of information processing in the
brain. Over the last decade, indeed, an increasing amount of evidence
has shown that there are neurons in the premotor cortex of non-human
and human primates that respond to particular classes of visual stimuli. The majority of neurons in the area F5 in monkeys, and inferior
frontal gyrus in humans, for example, convert the layout properties of
objects into the appropriate motor patterns for action execution (Rizzolatti et al. 1988; Rizzolatti & Luppino 2001). In a famous single cell
recording experiment, Murata et al. (1997) found that almost half of
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the neurons in the premotor area of monkeys’ brains responded significantly to the sight of graspable objects, independently of the actual
execution of any action. Those “visuomotor” neurons showed a specific selectivity, discharging more strongly during fixation on certain
solids as opposed to others, the difference between them depending
on the kind of grip afforded by those objects — e.g., precision grip,
finger prehension etc. (Rizzolatti & Luppino 2001). Similar data in
humans show that the visual sight of graspable objects and tools somatotopically activates the same cortical areas used to reach and act on
the visual target, even independently of the subject’s intentions, and
the actual execution of actions (Chao & Martin 2000; Grèzes & Decety
2002; Petit et al. 2006). Further evidence (Sakata et al. 1995; Murata et al. 2000) demonstrates that this kind of sensorimotor selectivity
is also present in the anterior intraparietal area AIP, which projects its
connections directly into the premotor cortex (Borra et al. 2008). A
large proportion of neurons in this area discharge during object fixation, and are selective for object properties such as shape, size, and
orientation (Srivastava et al. 2009; Verhoef et al. 2010). Moreover, it
has been shown that the functional inactivation of AIP has the consequence of impairing the ability to shape hand movement according to
the geometrical characteristics of the object to be grasped (Gallese et al.
1994).
Such evidence shows that the parietofrontal circuit comprising the
AIP and the premotor cortex — also called the ventro-dorsal stream (Rizzolatti & Matelli 2003) — has a critical role in the extraction of visuomotor properties for object-oriented hand actions (Shikata et al. 2003).
Remarkably, it has been shown on the basis of anatomical data that the
entire inferior intraparietal lobule IPL — of which the AIP is part —
receives inputs from visual areas MT/V5, which in turn receive input
from the primary visual cortex V1 (Galletti et al. 2001; Gamberini et al.
2002; Rizzolatti & Matelli 2003). This reveals the presence of a direct
connection between the visual areas that get inputs from the retina and
the sensorimotor areas of the parietofrontal circuit.
Remarkably, the ventro-dorsal path exploits a direct matching system that automatically maps the perceptual information on a specific
motor plan for action (Gallese et al. 2002; Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011).
This matching system makes it possible to detect the visuomotor pat-
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terns of action-related features in the environment without involving
high-level cognitive functions, i.e., memory retrievals or propositional
representations of the object. Accordingly, since the perceptual stimulus conveys enough information to activate the sensorimotor system in
the parietofrontal circuit, the dorsal path instantiates an occurrence of
linear processing.4
Interestingly, this example is consistent with the refined approach
to IP introduced in Section 2. Actually, the information processing implemented within the dorsal stream suffices for the ecological needs
of the organism (e.g. locating objects, grasping tools, etc.) and does
not recruit other sources of information. This means that the dorsal
stream can be considered to be conveying information — albeit in a
non-propositional format – about the location of the target, its shape
and the possibilities of actions that the environment provides (Nanay
2013; Butterfill & Sinigaglia 2012).
To sum up, the introduction of a direct matching system implemented by dorsal processing makes it possible to explain how the perceptual stimulus suffices to elicit the activation of the parietofrontal
circuit involved in planning and executing motor actions. Accordingly,
the large amount of evidence concerning perceptual processing in the
dorsal stream shows that the sensorimotor coupling between perception and action can be well accounted for in terms of IP.
5.

CONCLUSION

This paper focuses on the possibility of providing an inferential model
of perception that does not involve propositional information and conceptual bindings. In particular, I have argued in favor of a distinction
between a linear and a distributed kind of visual processing. The former
serves the ability to perceive by directly detecting and tracing perceptual features in the environment, whereas the latter serves the ability
to classify objects according to internal resources such as memory and
propositional knowledge. I have supported this claim by showing that
the visuomotor matching system instantiated by the dorsal stream of
the visual system is actually a case of linear processing serving for visuomotor transformation.
Interestingly, this view opens the door to the development of a new
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theory of affordance perception, focusing on how the direct detection
of action possibilities in the environment is made possible by information processing. Following this line, in the near future new trends of
research could be addressed to the issue of bridging the gap between
the standard ecological definition and the neurobiological approach to
affordance perception.
Notes
1

This distinction was first introduced by Lissauer (1890).
Interestingly, this kind of deficit can be specific for objects belonging to a certain
class. For example, it can be stronger for animate objects than for inanimate objects
(Warrington & Shallice 1984; Humphreys et al. 1995; Caramazza & Shelton 1998).
3
A different account of DF’s visuomotor robustness has recently been proposed. Schenk
(2010, 2012) argues that DF’s preserved ability for visually guided actions might reflect
the fact that many visuomotor tasks can be solved on the basis of feedbacks from different
sensory modalities. In particular, DF’s ability to adjust the shape of her hand according to
the object’s size would, he suggests, be prompted by haptic feedbacks about the object’s
size, thus bypassing her visual impairment. However, this view would require more information concerning the neurophysiology of the visual ventral path and its connections
with the other different modalities, see Borra et al. (2008).
4
The interaction between the dorsal stream and other areas of the brain is an open
field of investigation. Borra et al. (2008) have observed robust connections between the
AIP and the temporal areas. One hypothesis is that the information involved in object
discrimination can be conveyed from the ventral path to the AIP in order to refine the
selection among the detected action possibilities. If this is confirmed, the linearity of
the processing in the dorso-ventral stream is likely to be limited to the path linking the
primary visual area and the AIP.
2
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